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Ten Central European countries became members of the European Union in the years 2004 - 
2007. They constitute 20% of the EU’s total population; and even though their economic 
output is much lower, it rises dynamically. New members’ impact on the EU policies has 
nevertheless been limited. This is due not only to the arcane voting rules within the EU, but 
also to the lack of a common agenda among the Central European countries. Our paper 
illustrates that the new members rarely vote together and that their influence is thus fairly 
limited. We argue that as the EU seemingly lacks energy to implement further reforms that 
would stimulate its economy, impetus for change may come from Central European countries. 
To that end, however, they have to coordinate their voting and become a more coherent 
voting group than they are now. 
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Introduction 
Central European countries
1 have traveled a long way from their 
underdeveloped, grey and autarky economies in the late 1980’s. Ten out of the 
eleven countries that can be qualified as “former socialist countries” now 
boast membership in the EU, NATO, some of them are also OECD members, 
already “graduated” from the World Bank program and shift to the donor 
status. Slovenia uses the European currency – the euro – since 2007, Slovakia 
is expected to join the currency in 2009. All countries in the region grow fast 
– a sad exception being Hungary.  
The transition from the centrally planned economies to a market system has, 
thus, raised wealth of CEE’s citizens and brought these countries, once 
isolated within the autarkic Soviet bloc, into the fore of policy making, at least 
in the European context. One may assume that the shared history and 
economic problems would push these countries together, so they would share 
the same positions vis-à-vis the main European policies.  
In this paper, we test this hypothesis analyzing the data on decision making in 
the European Union. We discuss complex decision making rules within the 
EU and we illustrate the relative power of the CEE countries. In the second 
part of the paper we analyze voting patterns of the CEE countries in the main 
EU’s decision-making body – the European Council. We show that the CEE 
countries raise objections only occasionally and that they almost never vote 
together. This finding suggests that either there is no shared agenda for the 




1.  CEE in the EU: Political Economy and Decision Making 
 
A.  Decision making in the EU 
 
The decision-making process within the European Union is very complex. 
The main institutions within the EU are the European Commission (EC), the 
European Parliament (EP), the European Councils (there are nine of them plus 
                                                 
1 We use term CEE as to describe the following eleven countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. All but Croatia are members 
of the EU, hence the term EU10.    3
the European Council of heads of states) and the European Central Bank 
(ECB). Authorities of these institutions often overlap making the decision 
process even more complicated. See Wallace, Wallace and Pollack (2005) for 
more detailed analysis of the EU voting system.   
Decision making within the EU is so complex because it must accommodate 
national interest of 27 countries. The EU is a club of sovereign states whereby 
each country, no matter how small, requires at least a symbolic power over the 
EU’s decisions. This renders simple voting procedures not very useful and 
creates conditions for the current plethora of various voting methods, super-
majorities, double or even triple-majorities, and so on.  
First of all, the European Commission and the ECB do not really vote, they 
always reach “consensus” which makes analysis of their decision process 
extremely difficult, as it is not known how the consensus was molded what 
was offered and what was agreed as a compensation for potentially agitating 
countries.
2 
The executive branch of the European Union – the European Commission - 
headed since November 2004 by former Portuguese prime minister Jose 
Manuel Barroso – has adopted a more careful approach in proposing new 
legislation and seeks strong coalitions of countries before it proposes any 
change (notable exemption being the planned directive on cutting car-
emission limits for cars that infuriated the German industry representatives, 
government and even the German commissioner Gunter Verheugen – see, for 
example http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/eu-gets-cold-feet-capping-car-
emissions/article-161111). It also pursues more negotiating with the European 
Parliament, but it is not, by any measure, paralyzed. It is yet to vote on single 
agenda item and still gets most of new legislation through very quickly.  
The European Parliament does vote, but it is rather a weak EU institution, 
even though it is the only directly elected EU institution. The EP shares its 
legislative power with the Council and it can vote only on those issues 
transferred to it by national parliaments. Namely, the EP lacks the legislative 
initiative which is rare for a parliament. The EP does not appoint the European 
Commission President, either. This power belongs to the European Council. 
The European Parliament can, on the other hand, veto the European 
Commission appointment and its intervention brought down the Commission 
of president Santer in 1995 after allegations of corruption (the Commission 
                                                 
2 With respect to the ECB, we discuss the “dynamic consensus” below.   4
resigned en masse in March 1999). The Parliament also decides on the EU 
budget, which is important but limited in its size of about 1% of the EU’s 
GDP. 
In this paper, thus, we concentrate on the Council of the European Union (or 
the Council), which is the main decision-making body within the European 
Union’s institutional architecture. It consists of representatives of all national 
governments and it has the legislative powers usually reserved for 
parliaments. The Council discusses European Commission’s proposals and if 
it approves them, they become a part of the mandatory acquis communautaire. 
In some areas, the Council dominates the parliament and only consults it but 
the Parliament cannot amend the proposals. This is the case mostly in foreign 
and security policies where member states are more worried about their 
national sovereignty. In other areas, the EC proposal must be approved by the 
European Parliament as well. But the Council remains the main decision-
making body of the European Union, where the most power is concentrated.  
In the following chapters, we first briefly discuss European Central Bank 
decision process, as it is importantly influenced by the CEE countries’ actual 
or expected membership. Then we turn to the Council and discuss its various 
decision making procedures.  
 
B.  European Central Bank 
European Central Bank oversees the most centralized policy within the 
European Union - monetary policy where member countries share the same 
currency, they apply the same interest rates and their financial systems 
become ever more integrated. Eurozone consisted of eleven countries upon its 
establishment in 1999 (Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Italy, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Ireland and Finland). It was later joined by 
Greece, and in 2007 by Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia. In May 2008, Slovakia 
was formally endorsed as the 16
th member of the Eurozone and it is expected 
to become a member in January 2009.  
Slovakia’s entry to the Eurozone will trigger an overhaul of the voting system 
in the ECB – see Frenkel and Fendel (2003). Until 2008, the ECB’s 
Governing Council consists of six members of the Executive board (appointed 
by “common accord of the governments of the member States… on 
recommendation from the Council after it has consulted the European 
Parliament and the Governing Council”) and by governors of member states’ 
central banks (currently 15 members).    5
When the membership increases to 16 countries, new system should be 
ushered in whereby the total number of votes is capped at 21. Six votes are 
casted by the members of the Executive board. Remaining fifteen votes are to 
be distributed among governors of member states’ central banks. Initially, as 
there are 16-18 member states, governors will be split into two groups. The 
first group would consist of five largest Eurozone member countries 
(Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands)
3 that will vote on each 
occasion. Remaining eleven-thirteen member states would get only 10 votes 
and the voting rights would rotate among them to ensure equal voting rights 
for each country. When there are more then 19 members of the Eurozone, the 
first group of five large countries will see its number of votes to drop to four.  
These changes in the voting system may explain the ECB’s reserved position 
vis-à-vis new members (the ECB famously turned down Lithuania application 
in 2006 as its inflation was 0.1pp above the threshold set by the Maastricht 
criteria
4). The ECB has just one instrument – interest rate – to steer the EU’s 
economic policy. However, the more countries join the ECB, the more diverse 
they will be and the more complicated it will be to find an interest rate that 
would respond to these countries’ economic needs (see de Grauwe (2005) for 
a discussion).  
It remains to be seen how the ECB voting pattern will develop under the new 
voting system. Currently, the ECB does not, formally, take vote. Instead, it 
applies so called “dynamic consensus” to take any decision. Under this 
method, the President of the ECB summarizes positions of majority of the 
Governing Council, proposes the decision and “invites” remaining members 
to join the majority. As the decision can be, formally, taken by a simple 
majority, the remaining members routinely join the decision, as to 
demonstrate the ECB’s unity.  
Under the new voting system, not all countries will take part in formal voting, 
as their voting rights will “rotate”. This may not be a problem, as long as 
informal decision making process will keep countries involved in the decision 
making. Moreover, large member countries may not become to “rotate” for a 
long time. The first group of 5 countries will hold 5 votes until a 19
th member 
country joins the Eurozone, a distant perspective now. Moreover, large 
                                                 
3 The fifth “large country” place is clearly reserved for the UK, should it ever join the Eurozone. 
4 The ECB and the Council voiced concerns about sustainability of the Lithuanian inflation, the view that 
might have been vindicated by a surge in the inflation in Lithuania that stood at 11.3% in March 2008, way 
above the Eurozone’s inflation rate.   6
countries, together with the Executive Board members who often hail form 
these large countries (current members are from France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Austria and Greece, in the previous Board members were from France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Finland), will hold majority in the 
Eurozone consisting of 16-18 members. The balance will turn to “second 
rank” countries when a 19
th member joins the Eurozone.  
 
C.  Voting systems in the European Council 
The voting procedures in the European Council are not straightforward, to say 
the least. Different issues are subject to different voting methods and these 
methods evolve over time. The Council votes in one of three ways; unanimity, 
simple majority or qualified majority The unanimity rule now applies only in 
particularly sensitive areas such as asylum, taxation and the common foreign 
and security policy. It may be further reduced by the Lisbon Treaty, if it is 
approved by all 27 member states. In most cases the Council votes on issues 
by qualified majority voting. The EU’s method of qualified majority voting is 
very sophisticated as it applies three different majorities. First, countries have 
different number of votes (see table below) and a minimum of 255 votes out 
of 345 (74%) must be casted in favor of a proposal. Second, the proposal must 
be further approved by a majority of member states (sometimes even a two–
third majority). Last, the "demographic safety net" is applied, when the 
qualified majority must represents at least 62% of the population of the Union.  
Many EU insiders were afraid that this finely balanced and inherently 
complicated voting system may be unfit for an enlarged European Union. 
Indeed, the fear of “stalemate” and dysfunctional decision-making as the EU 
becomes a much more heterogeneous club of 27 countries was the most 
frequent rationale mentioned as the European Convent, a special body headed 
by a former French president Giscard d’Estaing, attempted to change the 
decision making process in its draft of the European Union’s Constitution.  
The argument was that original European institutions, established in Treaty of 
Rome of 1957, were designed for a club of six countries and adopted to the 
Union of fifteen countries that became members by 1994. These fifteen, with 
a possible exception of Greece, were rather homogenous Western European 
countries, long honed in intergovernmental negotiations and with a shared 
“responsibility” for the European project (even though different countries 
might have projected different European Union visions). However, the   7
Constitution draft was, eventually, defeated in referendums in Germany and 
the Netherlands in 2005. A modified Treaty of Lisbon (see below) then 
suffered the same fate in 2008 in Ireland. The European Union has, thus, 
enlarged to 27 members and still uses principles of decision making from the 
1957 Treaty of Rome that were adjusted in 2001’s Treaty of Nice. Meanwhile, 
the dispersion of income widened considerably, as new members’ GDP was 
much lower than incumbents’ average. Also, new members have a different 
















Bulgaria 7,7  10  2,9%  18  (2,3%)  1,55 
Czech 
Republic 
10,2 12  3,5%  24  (3,1%)  2,08 
Estonia 1,3  4  1,2%  6  (0,8%)  0,27 
Hungary 10,1  12  3,5%  24  (3,1%)  2,03 
Latvia 2,3  4  1,2%  9  (1,1%)  0,46 
Lithuania 3,4  7  2,0%  13  (1,7%)  0,68 
Poland 38,5 27  7,8%  54  (6,9%)  7,70 
Romania 21,7  14  4,1%  35  (4,5%)  4,36 
Slovakia 5,4  7  2,0%  14  (1,8%)  1,09 
Slovenia 2,0  4  1,2%  7  (0,9%)  0,41 
Croatia 4,5  n.a.    n.a.  n.a. 
Share in 
total 
21% 29% 29%  26,0%  20,63% 
 
In 2007, the European Union adopted a new Lisbon Treaty that would change 
the voting system again. It would make voting power proportional to the 
country’s population and would insert so called double majority whereby any 
proposal must be supported by 55% of member states and by 65% of the EU 
                                                 
5 The Partnership and Co-operation agreement that is supposed to regulate the EU-Russia trade in energy, is 
a good example of these differences. The agreement was signed in 1997, long before the enlargement. 
When it was to be re-negotiated, it was first blocked by Poland in 2007 and then by Lithuania in 2008. Both 
countries demanded much stronger position of the EU vis-à-vis Russia than “old” EU members were 
prepared to force upon increasingly arduous Russia.    8
population. These changes would increase power of largest EU members and 
limit mid-sized countries. The ten CEE countries would see their combined 
share of votes falling from 29% to 21%, as nine out of ten countries would see 
their voting power reduced, sometimes by as much as one half. Only 
Romania’s position would be (marginally) increased. The double majority, on 
the other hand, would increase importance off small countries, as any thirteen 
countries, no matter how small, may block any EU initiative, therefore actual 
“voting power” of small countries would not fall as much as raw voting shares 
would indicate. For details see Table 2. 
Therefore, decision making process in the enlarged European Union was 
bound to get more complicated. While it is fair to say that the EU is still 
digesting the enlargements from 2004 and 2007 and it is too early for final 
conclusions, preliminary data show that decision-making paralysis has failed 
to materialize in the new EU (see Hagemann, and De Clerck-Sachsse, 2007a). 
While the transparency of the Councils decisions is not high, there are several 
attempts to classify its voting history. The following table illustrates, the 
legislative process in the EU has stabilized. Year 2004 was the most hectic, as 
almost 600 different legislation acts were approved to accommodate that 
year’s enlargement. In 2005, number of acts approved slipped back to 413, but 
it rebounded to 516 in 2006 (no data for 2007 available at the moment).  
 
Table 3: Legislative Acts adopted (European Council regulations and 
directives, European Parliament directives) 2000-2006 
 Regulations  Directives  Decisions  Total 
2000 189  43 216  448 
2001 152  58 217  427 
2002 164  52 217  433 
2003 191  64 257  512 
2004 208  52 313  573 
2005 127  36 250  413 
2006 199  64 253  516 
Source: Plechanovová (2008), Prelex database,  
 
Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse (2007b) use a slightly different dataset 
that, nevertheless, confirms that the legislation pace has not slowed down 
significantly after the enlargement. According to Hagemann’s database, the 
Councils adopted 160 acts on average in 1999-2003. In 2004, the number   9
jumped to 226 and then fell back to 121 in 2005 and stabilized at 217 in 2006. 
It is, thus, seems fair to conclude that the paralysis of the European Council 
decision has yet failed to materialize and the enlarged Union seems to be 
working as smoothly as the EU15 used to.  
 
2.  Voting patterns and emerging coalitions in the Council 
 
We now turn to the actual decisions adopted by the Council. We will first 
discuss the voting pattern in all Council meeting and we later shift our 
attention to the Council for Economic and Financial Affairs.  
 
A.  The European Council 
As we have already noted, the openness and transparency of the Councils’ 
decision making is not particularly high. There are several reasons for this 
state of affairs. First, the very method of the Councils decisions is partly to 
blame. Decisions are often postponed as long as there is no opposition. So 
when the final decision is taken, many countries that might have opposed it 
have been meanwhile placated by some unspecified compensations or they do 
not formally dissent as not to be seen as troublemakers (see the discussion of 
dynamic consensus method by the ECB). Secondly, the European Union’s 
institutions do not want to be seen as divisive, so they do not publicize 
countries’ disagreements.  
To illustrate the point, the basic statistics might be useful. In the period of 
May 2004 to the end of 2006, there were 3399 proposals discussed in the 
Council. Out of these, only 207 proposals (6% of total) were contested (i.e. a 
country either abstained from voting or voted against the proposal) by at least 
one member state (Plechanovová, 2008). A single member country contested 
77 cases, remaining 130 were contested by more countries and only six 
proposals were rejected (0,18% of all proposals). 
In our following analysis, we use the database collected by Sara Hagemann of 
the European Policy Centre in Brussels. The database contains details on 
almost 1,500 votes in the council, out of which 543 took place after the May 
2004’s enlargement of the European Union (the database runs until the end of 
October 2007). It also contains information on voting of all member countries, 
so we may incur several interesting information from it. Out of 543 voting, 
431 were unanimously in favor (80%). The 132 votes that were contested 
were 66 contested by at least one member from Central Europe, i.e. Central 
European countries objected to 15% of the Commission proposals that were   10
submitted to the Council between May 2004 and October 2007. In the 
following discussion we will largely disregard Bulgaria and Romania who 
were only 10 months on the Council and both casted a single contest vote, too 
little to make any reasonable conclusions about their policies.  
Among the remaining eight CEE countries, Poland was the most active 
opponent: it contested the proposal seventeen times, followed by Slovakia 
with 11 and Latvia with 10 dissents. On the other extreme Slovenia contested 
only one proposal during its 42 months on the Council.  
Given the small number of contests, it is not surprising that the Central 
European contest votes were spread thinly and has never accomplished a 
reversal in the policy. The table shows that, on average, the Czech Republic 
was most successful in gathering support for its contests (or most willing to 
support other countries’ dissents): it was joined by 3.3 countries when 
dissenting. Estonia and Slovakia had on average support of 3 countries when 
dissenting. On the other extreme, Slovenia abstained from a single vote and at 
that occasion, only Hungary supported it. The issue concerned “Schengen 
border code” which set standards for movement of persons across borders and 
Hungary voted against the proposal.  
Table also indicates that Slovenia and Hungary are the two countries most out 
of the sync with the remaining CEE countries: they did not join any contest by 
any other country from the region. As note above, Slovenia contested only one 
proposal and it was not supported by any of the EU15 member states, either. 
Hungary was supported most often – three times – by Greece and twice by 
Belgium.  
The data show that Slovakia and Poland often support each other in dissent: 
Poland supported 63% of all Slovak dissents and Slovakia returned the favor 
in 40% of Polish dissents. Poland seems also sympathetic to Latvian and 
Lithuanian contests. Czechs and Estonians spread their contests across all 
CEE countries more or less equally.   11
Table 4: Voting in the European Council  
  BG CZ EE HU LV LI  PO RO SK SL  ∑ 
∑  1 9 2 5 10  9 17  1 11  1 66 
BG     1      1   2 
CZ    1   1 2 2 1 1   8 
EE  1    1       2 
HU 1            1  2 
LV  1  1     2 3 1 1   9 
LI   2    2    3 1 2   10 
PO  2    3  3    7    1 5  
RO  1    1  1    1   4 
SK    1     1 2 7 1   12 
S L     1         1 
AT      1  7   7   15 
BE    3 1 2 4 1 5       16 
CY  1 1   1 1   1       5 
DN  1 2   1 2 1 1 1 1   10 
FI    2 1   1 1   1 1   7 
F R   1           1  
GE   1   1     1   2 
GR  1 3   3 4 1 5       18 
I R           1    1  
IT        1   1 2       5 
L U            0  
MT      1  1  6   7   15 
N E            0  
PT  6  1   1   3     11 
SP  1      1     2 
SW   1   1        2 
UK   1        2   3 
*  4  3.3 3  2.2 2.4 1.9 2.7 6.0 2.9 1.0  
*Average number of co-sponsors 
 
The table allows us to analyze positions of the “old members” from the EU15 
as well. It is fair to say that none of the countries was an ardent supporter of 
CEE dissents. Luxembourg and the Netherlands did not support a single 
contest from a CEE country. The big five EU members – Germany, France, 
UK, Italy and Spain – were also indifferent to the CEE concerns as they   12
casted mere 13 voices in support of any CEE dissent. The most active 
supporters, if it is the word, was Greece (18 joint dissents with a CEE 
country), Belgium, Austria and Malta. (Greece actually opposed a decision by 
a Council only 15 times, but we add each co-vote with a CEE country, even if 
it was on the same issue.) 
These preliminary results cast a doubt on a shared wisdom that the CEE 
members are supported mostly by the UK and Scandinavian countries. 
Moreover, analyzing the data a bit more carefully, an unexpected patter 
emerges. The most trusted partner of the Czech Republic seems to be Portugal 
that supported 6 out of 9 Czech dissents (67%). Even more oddly, an 
improbable group of Poland, Slovakia, Austria and Malta emerges. These 
countries supported their dissents markedly more often than they supported 
other countries. More research is however needed before we may determine 
whether this is only a statistical occurrence or whether there is an MAPS axis 
within the European Union.  
   13
 
B.  EcoFin – an detailed analysis: Does the CEE have a common agenda? 
 
In order to structure our dataset further ,  w e  l o o k  a t  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  C E E  
countries in various councils. There are nine sectoral Councils plus the 
European Council that assembles heads of states. Out of the nine Councils of 
Ministers, six deal mostly with economic agenda. They are: 
 Council for Economic and Financial Affairs 
Box 1: When Greece voted together with CEE: 
Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2287/2003 as concerns fishing opportunities in 
Greenland waters 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to electromagnetic compatibility and repealing Directive 89/336/EEC 
Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 laying down general provisions on the 
Structural Funds concerning the extension of the duration of the PEACE programme and the granting of 
new commitment appropriations 
Council Decision fixing the date of application of certain provisions of Regulation (EC) No 871/2004 
concerning the introduction of some new functions for the Schengen Information System, including in 
the fight against terrorism 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 74/408/EEC 
relating to motor vehicles with regard to the seats, their anchorages and head restraints 
Council Regulation concerning the common organisation of the market in hops and repealing 
Regulations (EEC) No 1696/71, (EEC) No 1037/72, (EEC) No 879/73 and (EEC) No 1981/82 
Council Regulations amending Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for 
direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and 
establishing certain support schemes for farmers 
Council Regulation establishing a temporary scheme for the restructuring of the sugar industry in the 
European Community and amending Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 on the financing of the common 
agricultural policy 
Council Decision on Community strategic guidelines for Rural Development (Programming period 
2007- 2013) 
Council Regulation repealing Regulation (EC) No 3690/93 establishing a Community system laying 
down rules for the minimum information to be contained in fishing licences 
Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council introducing a simplified regime for the control 
of persons at the external borders, based on the unilateral recognition by the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia of certain documents as 
equivalent to their national visas for the purposes of transit through their territories 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 417/2002 on 
the accelerated phasing-in of double-hull or equivalent design requirements for single-hull oil tankers 
Council Regulation on the marketing of the meat of bovine animals age twelve months or less 
Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003 on the common organisation of the market 
in cereals 
Council Regulation on organic production and labelling of organic products and repealing Regulation 
(EEC) No 2092/91 
   14
 Council for Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs 
 Council for Competitiveness 
 Council for Transport, Telecommunications and Energy 
 Council for Agriculture and Fisheries   
 Council for Environment 
The remaining three councils are: 
 Council for General Affairs and External Relations 
 Council for Justice and Home Affairs 
 Council for Education, Youth and Culture 
 
The following table 5 shows distribution of dissent votes by CEE countries. 
One half of all dissents were casted in the Agriculture Council (34 out of 66) 
where Poland used its voice 11 times, Latvia 6 times. Other Councils were 
much less contested and two (Employment and Social Affairs and General 
and Foreign Affairs councils did not see a single dissent from any CEE 
country. The details on dissent votes are listed in the Appendix. Perhaps, 
surprisingly, there was little discussion in the Environment Council, where 
only 6 dissents were raised by CEE countries and not in one case any two 
CEE countries dissented together. This suggests that there is little shared 
agenda in the Environment Council among the CEE countries.  
Our goal in this chapter is to further analyze position of the CEE countries in 
perhaps the most important Council of Ministers – in the Council for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, i.e. EcoFin. The Council consists of Finance 
ministers and convenes every month. It occupies itself with monitoring 
members’ budgetary policy, their economic policy coordination, but it also 
covers financial markets issues, including regulation and supervision. The 
EcoFin is also the key player in the annual EU budget adoption.    15
Table 5: Voting in the European Council  
  BG CZ EE HU LV LI  PO RO SK SL ∑   
∑  1 9 2 5 10  9 17  1 11  1  66   
Agri 
(187) 
1 3 1 1 6 4 11  0 7 0  34  18% 
Env 
(41) 
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0  6  15% 
Comp
et (40) 
0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0  3  8% 
EcoFi
n (59) 
0 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 0  7  12% 
Soc 
(25) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0% 
Trans 
(45) 
0 3 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0  7  16% 
Edu 
(13) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0  1  8% 
Just 
(40) 
0 0 0 2 1 1 2 0 1 1  8  20% 
GA 
(48) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0% 
                
Notes:   Agri –   Council for Agriculture and Fisheries   
Env -   Council for Environment 
Compet -   Council for Competitiveness 
EcoFin - Council for Economic and Financial Affairs 
Soc -   Council for Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs 
Trans -   Council for Transport, Telecommunications and Energy 
Edu -   Council for Education, Youth and Culture 
Just –   Council for Justice and Home Affairs 
GA -  Council for General Affairs and External Relations 
 
The decisions of the EcoFin are usually taken by the “qualified majority 
system”, where countries have different number of votes as set by the Nice 
Treaty (see table 2). Exceptions are fiscal matters that are decided by the 
unanimity principle. The EcoFin discussions are among the livelier and open 
among the Councils. The EcoFin famously failed to upheld reprimand to 
Germany and France when the two were castigated by the European   16
Commission for breaching the Stability and Growth Pact rules in 2004 and 
2005.  
However, the CEE’s activity in the Economic and Finance Affairs is 
surprisingly low, as long as we measure it by dissenting votes. In the period 
May 2004-December 2007, there were 59 decisions taken in this area. 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovenia and Poland did not challenge any of these. Latvia 
challenged two decisions and remaining countries resorted to a dissent just 
once. Most of this dissent concentrated to the Council regulation regarding a 
temporary scheme for restructuring the sugar industry (see 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st13/st13661-ad01.en07.pdf) 
when the Czech Republic, Slovakia (plus Finland and Denmark) voted against 
the proposal and Latvia, Lithuania and Romania abstained. In this case, thus, 
five out of ten new members contested the regulation, but to no avail, as the 
Council adopted it anyway. 
In order to get a more detailed analysis of the EcoFin decision making, we 
further analyzed minutes of the EcoFin as they are published by the Czech 
Ministry of Finance (http://www.mfcr.cz/cps/rde/xchg/mfcr/xsl/ecofin.html). 
As these information are not strictly representative (and are available in Czech 
only), they should be interpreted carefully. We should also note that 
disagreements are often voiced informally we had to use our discretion in 
selecting these “contentious” issues and other analyses may identify other sets 
of issues. On the other hand, our analysis allows an insight into informal and 
formal discussion before the vote is taken, so they may reflect countries’ 
positions before the “dynamic consensus process” is put into motion.  
The table in the appendix 2 summarizes main contentious points that were 
debated at the EcoFin since January 2007 until spring of 2008. We have 
identified 26 disagreements where one or more countries objected to the 
proposal or raised serious doubts about its merits. Some of the issues emerge 
repeatedly (the navigation system Galileo or corporate tax base 
harmonization), some are dealt with very quickly (the EBRD presidency).  
Some preliminary analysis: new member states were active in 14 out of 26 
disputes. Poland was the most frequent participant: it was involved in eight 
discussions. On the other hand Bulgaria and Romania did participate only 
once. We may thus say that the EU10 do take position in the EcoFin 
discussions and are not afraid of raising their voice.    17
However, our analysis seems to support other authors as we do not find any 
significant cohesion among the EU10. In most cases the EU10 were either 
neutral (i.e. there were no positions taken by any of the EU10 countries) or 
they were split. Poland often disagreed with the Czech Republic – Poland was 
in favor of an initiative limiting sovereign funds investment, the Czechs were 
against. Czechs supported pollution trading while Poland opposed it. Hungary 
was the only EU10 country supporting (the Hungarian…) Commissioner 
Kovacs in his attempts to consolidate tax base for multinational corporations 
in the EU. Hungary and the Czech Republic clashed over the EBRD 
presidency (only to be steamrolled by Germans). We could not identify a 
single issue where the EU10 would take a common position and win. The 
closest they came was in January 2007 when they helped to kill the 
Commission proposal to set national targets for eliminating excessive 
administrative procedures. The Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia 
and Estonia joined Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal and the European 
Commission backtracked.  
Therefore, there appears to be no common agenda among the new member 
states in the EcoFin. According to the anecdotic evidence, the new member 
states are similarly inefficient in other Councils, namely in Agriculture and in 
Environment, even though these two Councils distribute most of the European 
Union’s budget. 
This passivity and lack of common stand may be caused by many factors. The 
new member states may not believe that the EcoFin decision will be relevant 
for them, so they do not bother to dispute them. The may also negotiate before 
the EcoFin discusses the matter and “piggy-back” on some large country 
opposition. Or, the new member state might believe that their opposition will 
not change the outcome anyway.  
 
3.  Conclusions 
 
Membership of the ten Central European countries in the European Union, 
while still recent, has been an overall success. The economic performance 
during the membership has been, so far, very robust. The region benefited 
from increased investments, exploding trade and, albeit limited, labor 
mobility. GDP growth rates have stabilized for most countries in unheard-of 
region of 5-7% annually, inflation was subdued and unemployment began to 
slowly fall.    18
It is, of course, difficult to determine whether this economic success is a direct 
consequence of the EU membership. Other European countries that had not 
joined the EU grew robustly as well (Romania, Bulgaria, but also Albania, 
Armenia, Georgia or Montenegro). However, the CEE economies definitely 
enjoyed a positive supply shock before and during the EU membership, as its 
stock of capital increased; the legal framework was standardized and 
familiarized to multinational firms. As a result of combination of factors, all 
countries in region experienced stable and positive economic growth, 
relatively low inflation and increased productivity, for the first time since the 
beginning of transition.  
However, with these initial effects slowly dissipating, the future developments 
of the CEE’s and indeed the whole EU’s economic policies depend to a large 
extent on the introduction of further reforms. European economies are still 
hampered by high taxes, excessive bureaucracy, limited mobility of labor and 
barriers to free movements of workers or firms in several major areas 
(services being the most evident example).  
Introduction of economic reforms is challenging within one country 
framework – witness conflicts in France, Italy, Czech Republic or Hungary, to 
mention only the most recent. Implementation of reforms in a Union of 27 
nations is extremely difficult. The European Union is a club of increasingly 
heterogeneous countries: from high spending Sweden and France to lean 
Estonia or Ireland, from agriculture oriented Romania and Greece to financial 
services dominated Britain.  
It is obvious that finding a consensus in such a heterogeneous group of 
countries is extremely difficult. One way to deal with the heterogeneity is to 
streamline decision-making processes and limit voting power of smaller 
countries. While the European Union tries to do exactly this in its Lisbon 
Treaty, it will never, nor should it eliminate frictions and ability of small 
countries (or their coalitions) to block important decisions.  
The remaining possibility to introduce reforms within the European Union is 
coalition building and relentless and long-term propagation of reforms. Our 
paper argued that Central and East European members of the EU have high 
stakes in reform agenda and in such coalition building. Their economies are 
still less developed that the “old” EU members. The CEE countries have also 
undergone major reforms in last two decades and their experiences with 
reforms are, with all caveats, positive. They, thus, may be more prepared for 
further push and they should be natural partners.    19
Our analysis, though, shows that the CEE countries do not propagate similar 
agenda within the EU, nor that they support each other consistently, perhaps 
with exemption of the nascent Polish-Slovak coalition in many Council 
decisions. Should the CEE countries become agents of the European Union 
future reforms, they have to come together and become more unified in their 
agenda and voting even if it means voting against some powerful “old” 
member countries.  
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Appendix 1: Voting in the Council – Contested votes in May 2004-October 
2007 
 
1) Environment Council: 
41 decisions 
Contests: 
Poland: 1  
Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Seventh Framework 
Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and 
demonstration activities (2007-2013) 
Czech Rep: 0 
Hungary: 1  
Council Regulation on organic production and labelling of organic products and 
repealing Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91) 
Slovakia: 1 (as Poland) 
Lithuania: 1  
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the rules for 
the participation of undertakings, research centres and universities in actions under 
the Seventh Framework Programme and for the dissemination of research results 
(2007-2013) 
Latvia: 1  
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations ("ROME II")) 
Slovenia: 0 




Note: no country contested the most controversial decision on regulation of 
chemicals - REACH (Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning the registration, evaluation, authorization and restriction of chemicals 
(REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 
1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and 
Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC). 
 





Council Regulation concerning the common organisation of the market in hops and repealing   21
Regulations (EEC) No 1696/71, (EEC) No 1037/72, (EEC) No 879/73 and (EEC) No 1981/82 
Council Regulations amending Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct 
support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for 
farmers 
Council Regulation establishing a temporary scheme for the restructuring of the sugar industry in the 
European Community and amending Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 on the financing of the common 
agricultural policy 
Council Decision on Community strategic guidelines for Rural Development (Programming period 
2007- 2013) 
Council Decisions on the Specific Programmes ("Cooperation", "Ideas", "People", Capacities, "JRC-
EC", "Euratom" and "JRC-Euratom") implementing the Seventh Framework Programmes - EC (2007-
2013) and EURATOM (2007-2011) 
Council Decision concerning the Specific Programme "Cooperation" implementing the Seventh 
Framework Programme of the European Community (2007-2013) for research, technological 
development and demonstration activities 
Council Decision concerning the Specific Programme "Ideas" implementing the Seventh Framework 
Programme of the European Community (2007-2013) for research, technological development and 
demonstration activities 
Council Decision concerning the Specific Programme "People" implementing the Seventh Framework 
Programme of the European Community (2007-2013) for research, technological development and 
demonstration activities 
Council Decision concerning the Specific Programme "Capacities" implementing the Seventh 
Framework Programme of the European Community (2007-2013) for research, technological 
development and demonstration activities 
Council Decision concerning the Specific Programme to be carried out by means of direct actions by the 
Joint Research Centre under the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community (2007-
2013) for research, technological development and demonstration activities 
Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1868/94 establishing a quota system in relation to the 
production of potato starch 
 
Czech Rep: 3 
Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a multiannual Community 
programme to make digital content in Europe more accessible, usable and exploitable 
Council Regulation concerning the common organisation of the market in hops and repealing 
Regulations (EEC) No 1696/71, (EEC) No 1037/72, (EEC) No 879/73 and (EEC) No 1981/82 
Council Regulation repealing Regulation (EC) No 3690/93 establishing a Community system laying 
down rules for the minimum information to be contained in fishing licences 
 
Hungary: 1 
Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003 on the common organisation of the 
market in cereals 
   22
Slovakia: 7 
Council Decisions on the Specific Programmes ("Cooperation", "Ideas", "People", Capacities, "JRC-
EC", "Euratom" and "JRC-Euratom") implementing the Seventh Framework Programmes - EC (2007-
2013) and EURATOM (2007-2011) 
Council Decision concerning the Specific Programme "Cooperation" implementing the Seventh 
Framework Programme of the European Community (2007-2013) for research, technological 
development and demonstration activities 
Council Decision concerning the Specific Programme "Ideas" implementing the Seventh Framework 
Programme of the European Community (2007-2013) for research, technological development and 
demonstration activities 
Council Decision concerning the Specific Programme "People" implementing the Seventh Framework 
Programme of the European Community (2007-2013) for research, technological development and 
demonstration activities 
Council Decision concerning the Specific Programme "Capacities" implementing the Seventh 
Framework Programme of the European Community (2007-2013) for research, technological 
development and demonstration activities 
Council Decision concerning the Specific Programme to be carried out by means of direct actions by the 
Joint Research Centre under the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community (2007-
2013) for research, technological development and demonstration activities 
Council Regulation amending Regulation (EEC) No 1883/78 laying down general rules for the financing 
of interventions by the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guarantee Section 
 
Lithuania: 4 
Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 laying down general provisions on the 
Structural Funds concerning the extension of the duration of the PEACE programme and the granting of 
new commitment appropriations 
Council Regulation laying down the rules for the participation of undertakings, research centres and 
universities in actions under the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Atomic Energy 
Community and for the dissemination of research results (2007-2011) 
Council Decisions on the Specific Programmes ("Cooperation", "Ideas", "People", Capacities, "JRC-
EC", "Euratom" and "JRC-Euratom") implementing the Seventh Framework Programmes - EC (2007-
2013) and EURATOM (2007-2011) 
Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1868/94 establishing a quota system in relation to the 
production of potato starch 
 
Latvia: 6 
Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 laying down general provisions on the 
Structural Funds concerning the extension of the duration of the PEACE programme and the granting of 
new commitment appropriations 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 
laying down rules for the prevention, control and eradication of certain transmissible spongiform 
encephalopathies as regards the extension of the period for transitional measures   23
Council Regulations amending Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for 
direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and 
establishing certain support schemes for farmers 
Council Regulation establishing a temporary scheme for the restructuring of the sugar industry in the 
European Community and amending Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 on the financing of the common 
agricultural policy 
Council Decision on Community strategic guidelines for Rural Development (Programming period 
2007- 2013) 
Council Regulation amending and correcting Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common rules 
for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support 
schemes for farmers and amending Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 on support for rural development by 




Council Regulation repealing Regulation (EC) No 3690/93 establishing a Community system 
laying down rules for the minimum information to be contained in fishing licences 
 
Bulgaria: 1 
Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003 on the common organisation of the 









Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2287/2003 as concerns fishing opportunities 
in Greenland waters 
 
Czech Rep: 2 
Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2287/2003 as concerns fishing opportunities in 
Greenland waters 
Council Decision authorising Sweden to apply a reduced rate of taxation to electricity consumed by 
households and service sector companies situated in certain areas in the north of Sweden in accordance 
















Czech Rep: 1 
Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 on the common organisation of the 
markets in the sugar sector 
 
Hungary: 1 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 
2037/2000  as regards the base  year for the allocation of quotas of hydrochlorofluorocarbons 
with respect to the Member States that acceded on May 2004 
 
Slovakia: 1 (as Czechs) 
Lithuania: 1 (dtto) 
Latvia: 2(dtto, plus 
Council Regulation laying down rules for voluntary modulation of direct payments 
provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct 
support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain 





Romania: 1 (as Czechs) 
 


















Council Regulation fixing the fishing opportunities and associated conditions for certain fish stocks and 
groups of fish stocks applicable in the Baltic Sea for 2007 
Council Regulation fixing the fishing opportunities and associated conditions for certain fish stocks and 
groups of fish stocks applicable in the Baltic Sea for 2007 
 
Czechs: 3 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cooperation between 
national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws 
("Regulation on consumer protection cooperation") 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal 
market 






Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal market 
Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing for the period 2007-2013 the 
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Appendix 2: Discontent in the EcoFin 2007-2008  



















 Sovereign  funds  Poland Split  ? 
  Taxes  G,  AU  neutral  It, F, Fi, 
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cars 
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 IMF  Pol  split  F 
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